DALAM
MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA DI PUTRAJAYA
(BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN)
RAYUAN SIVIL NO. 01- 11- 2004(W)
ANTARA
WESTCOURT CORPORATION SDN BHD … PERAYU
DAN
TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PEMBELI RUMAH … RESPONDEN
[Dalam Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia (Bidangkuasa Rayuan)
Rayuan Sivil No. W-01-55-2003
Antara
Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah … Perayu
Dan
Westcourt Corporation Sdn Bhd … Responden ]
[ Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Di Kuala Lumpur
(Bahagian Rayuan dan Kuasa-Kuasa Khas)
Permohonan Untuk Semakan Kehakiman No. R1-25-58-2003
Antara
Westcourt Corporation Sdn Bhd … Pemohon
Dan
1) Tan Geok Moi … Responden-
2) Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah Responden ]
KORAM: AHMAD FAIRUZ BIN DATO’ SHEIKH ABDUL HALIM, KHN
PAJAN SINGH GILL, HMP
AUGUSTINE PAUL, HMR
ALASAN
PENGHAKIMAN
(1) Pada 14 Jun 2004, Mahkamah ini telah mendengar rayuan perayu di
atas soalan berikut:-
“whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate on
cases where the sale and purchase agreement was entered into before
1 December 2002 and, if so to what extent”
Di akhir pendengaran rayuan, Mahkamah ini telah menolak rayuan
perayu dan berikut adalah alasan-alasan bagi keputusan tersebut.
(2) Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah (selepas ini disebut Tribunal)
telah ditubuhkan melalui Akta Pemaju Perumahan (Kawalan dan
Pelesenan) (Pindaan) 2002 (Akta Pindaan) yang berkuatkuasa pada 1
Disember 2002. Tujuan penubuhan ini adalah untuk membolehkan
Tribunal mendengar tuntutan oleh pembeli rumah terhadap pemaju
perumahan. Sebelum Akta Pindaan ini berkuatkuasa, seseorang pembeli
rumah boleh menuntut gantirugi terhadap pemaju perumahan melalui
tindakan di Mahkamah Sivil.
(3) Pada 27 Mac 2003, Tribunal di dalam Tuntutan No. TTPR/B/0057/03
telah membuat penghakiman bahawa perayu dikehendaki membayar kepada
Tan Geok Moi sebanyak RM13,926.74. Pada 5 Mei 2003 Mahkamah Tinggi
Kuala Lumpur telah memberi kebenaran kepada perayu untuk memulakan
prosiding semakan kehakiman (judicial review) untuk suatu perintah
certiorari bagi membatalkan penghakiman itu dan untuk suatu
pengisytiharan bahawa Tribunal tidak mempunyai bidangkuasa untuk
mendengar tuntutan di mana perjanjian jualbeli dimasuki sebelum 1
Disember 2002. Pada 4 September 2003 Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan
bahawa Tribunal tidak mempunyai bidangkuasa untuk mendengar
tuntutan-tuntutan itu dan memberikan perintah-perintah seperti yang
dipohon. Jika Parlimen, mengikut Mahkamah itu, berhasrat memberikan
Tribunal bidangkuasa kebelakangan untuk meliputi perjanjian jualbeli
yang dimasuki sebelum berkuatkuasanya Akta Pindaan tersebut, maka
Parlimen akan mengatakan sedemikian dengan perkataan-perkataan yang
jelas sepertimana dinyatakan di dalam s. 32(2) Akta Pindaan yang
berbunyi “Every agreement, assignment or charge lawfully entered
into between a purchaser and his financier before the appointed date
shall be subject to, and the parties thereto shall be entitled to
the benefits of, the new section 22C of the principal Act…...”. YA
Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi selanjutnya menekankan bahawa di bawah s. 16AD
hanya ketidakpatuhan kepada sesuatu award Tribunal dan bukannya
kemungkiran syarat perjanjian itu sendiri yang akan membawa kepada
liabiliti jenayah. Sungguhpun demikian award tersebut adalah,
mengikut YA, berlanjutan daripada kemungkiran perjanjian jualbeli.
Oleh kerana kemungkiran-kemungkiran dalam permohonan-permohonan di
hadapannya berlaku sebelum penubuhan Tribunal, dan oleh kerana
Parlimen tidak memperuntukkan dengan nyata bahawa pindaan-pindaan
itu mempunyai kesan kebelakangan, maka YA berpendapat bahawa
Tribunal tidak mempunyai bidangkuasa untuk mendengar
tuntutan-tuntutan yang terbit daripada perjanjian jualbeli yang
dimasuki sebelum 1 Disember 2002.
(4) Terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi itu, Tribunal merayu kepada
Mahkamah Rayuan. YA Richard Malanjum, HMR di dalam penghakimannya
berkata:-
“Applying the liberal and purposive approach to the statutory
provisions that deal with the jurisdiction of the Tribunal we find
that the argument advanced for the Respondents is premised on at
least two assumptions. Firstly, that the date in a sale and purchase
agreement is material in determining the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal. Secondly, any award given for a breach of a sale and
purchase agreement entered into prior to the appointed date,
particularly where the breach was before that date, would tantamount
to allowing criminal law to operate retrospectively since it is now
punishable being an offence for any failure to comply with or
satisfy such award. This argument of course relates to the legal
principle that criminal law cannot be made to operate
retrospectively unless specifically stipulated.
With respect, we find the first assumption to be without basis.
There is nothing in the provisions establishing the Tribunal or
related thereto which can be said to support it. In our view while
section 16M sets out the general jurisdiction of the Tribunal, it is
section 16N and in particular subsection 16N(2) thereof that
provides the perimeter of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”
Mengenai seksyen 16N(2) itu, YA Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan juga berkata:-
“Sub-section 16N(2) does not stipulate a cut off point by reference
to date of agreement vis-à-vis jurisdiction. All that is required of
the Tribunal in assuming jurisdiction to hear a claim presented
before it is to verify whether it is within the ambit of subsection
16N (2) that is to say:
(a) whether the claim is based ‘on a cause of action arising from
the sale and purchase agreement entered into between the homebuyer
and the licensed housing developer; and
(b) whether the claim is ‘brought by a homebuyer not later than
twelve months from the date of issuance of the certificate of
fitness for occupation for the housing accommodation or the expiry
date of the defects liability period as set out in the sale and
purchase agreement.’
We do not think there should be any additional or prerequisite term
to be read into the provisions. To do so would tantamount to adding
what is not in the statute. And that should not be done since Judges
are not legislators.”
YA HMR itu seterusnya berkata:-
“In fact the need for a sale and purchase agreement as a condition
precedent in filing a claim has also been waived by subsection
16N(3) ……”
(5) Mengenai seksyen 16AD, YA Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan itu memutuskan:-
“We are conscious of the counter-argument that without a breach in
the first place there is no question of an award being given by the
Tribunal and without an award there is no issue of penalty arising.
And if a breach occurred before the appointed date that would
effectively be criminalizing an act retrospectively.
With respect, a distinction should be drawn between a breach of the
sale and purchase agreement and an award rendered arising from such
breach. As we have stated earlier on it is not the breach of the
sale and purchase agreement that has been criminalized. Rather it is
the failure to comply with or satisfy any award given by the
Tribunal in connection with any claim made pursuant to such breach.
At any rate section 16AD does not empower the Tribunal to impose any
penalty. It only provides for a defaulter to be subject to
prosecution which invariably is the task of another authority in a
separate criminal proceeding. And on being prosecuted a defaulter is
at liberty to raise in defence the inapplicability of the section to
him. Such approach was successful in the case of Energoprojek (M)
Holdings v Public Prosecutor [1998] 5 MLJ 401. Accordingly, we do
not think section 16AD is intended to take away any substantive
right of any person. Neither is it meant to affect or limit the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal in any manner howsoever.”
(6) Berkenaan hujjah perayu bahawa jika Tribunal dibenarkan
mendengar tuntutan yang berasaskan perjanjian jualbeli yang dimasuki
sebelum tarikh 1 Disember 2002, ia akan menjejas dan memprejudis
hak-hak substantif responden, YA HMR itu berkata:-
“It is to be noted that the establishment of the Tribunal is in
effect a creation of another forum intended for speedy disposal at a
minimum cost of a prescribed claim up to the limit of RM25,000.00 by
a homebuyer against a licensed housing developer for breach of a
sale and purchase agreement entered into between the parties. There
is therefore no question of the rights of anyone being eroded or
removed as was envisaged in The Colonial Sugar Refining Company,
Limited v Irving (1905) AC 369 (PC). (See also: Lim Phin Khian v Kho
Su Ming [1996] 1 MLJ 1).”
And although it may be argued that the imposition of penalty has a
prejudicial effect, such preposition may be true if it is the breach
of the sale and purchase agreement that has been criminalized. But
here it is not the case.”
Lantas, rayuan perayu ditolak oleh Mahkamah Rayuan.
(7) Di Mahkamah ini, Encik Lambert Rasa-Ratnam bagi pihak perayu
telah juga berhujjah bahawa Tribunal tidak mempunyai bidangkuasa
untuk mendengar tuntutan berkaitan perjanjian jualbeli yang dimasuki
sebelum 1 Disember 2002. Untuk menyokong hujjahnya, Encik Lambert
Rasa-Ratnam merujuk kepada ungkapan penghakiman Mahkamah ini di
dalam kes Lim Phin Khian v Kho Su Ming [1996] 1 MLJ 22 yang berbunyi:-
“The presumption against retrospectivity of legislation is based
upon the judicial philosophy that Parliament does not intend an
unjust result. See Pesuruhjaya Ibu Kota Kuala Lumpur v Public
Trustee & Ors [1971] 2 MLJ 30 at 31. That this approach is still
current appears from two recent decisions of the House of Lords. The
first of these is ‘The Boucraa’ [1994] 1 ALL ER 20 at pp 29-30 where
Lord Mustill said:
My Lords, it would be impossible now to doubt that the court is
required to approach questions of statutory interpretation with a
disposition, and in some cases a very strong disposition, to assume
that a statute is not intended to have retrospective effect. Nor
indeed would I wish to cast any doubt on the validity of this
approach for it ensures that the courts are constantly on the alert
for the kind of unfairness which is found in, for example, the
characterization of past conduct which was lawful when it took
place, or on alterations to the antecedent natural, civil or
familiar status…”
(8) Encik Lambert Rasa-Ratnam juga merujuk kepada kes Sim Seoh Beng
@ Sim Sai Beng & Anor v Koperasi Tunas Muda Sungai Ara Bhd [1995] 1
CLJ 496 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan berkata:-
“In our judgment, the correct test to be applied to determine
whether a written law is prospective or retrospective is to first
ascertain whether it would affect substantive rights if applied
retrospectively. If it would, then, prima facie that law must be
construed as having prospective effect only, unless there is a clear
indication in the enactment that it is in any event to have
retrospectivity.”
(9) Encik Lambert Rasa-Ratnam menegaskan bahawa pindaan itu bukan
hanya berkaitan dengan forum tetapi melibatkan juga hak-hak
substantif perayu di mana dengan kemasukan seksyen 16AD, obligasi
perayu di sisi undang-undang telah berubah sifat. Ini kerana seksyen
16AD mengenakan penalti jenayah bagi ketidakpatuhan kepada award
yang dibuat oleh Tribunal dan penalti itu tidak dikenakan terhadap
perayu sebelum Akta Pindaan itu berkuatkuasa. Encik Lambert Rasa-Ratnam
merujuk kepada Craies on Statute Law (6th Edition) di mana di m.s.
386 penulis mentakrifkan undang-undang kebelakangan seperti berikut:-
“which takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under
existing laws or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty; or
attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or
considerations already past.”
(10) Encik Lambert Rasa-Ratnam berhujjah bahawa pihak-pihak, ketika
memasuki perjanjian jualbeli, tidak menjangkakan kemungkiran
perjanjian itu akan mengakibatkan kesalahan jenayah. Jika Tribunal
diberi bidangkuasa ke atas perjanjian sebelum 1 Disember 2002, ini
bermakna undang-undang jenayah akan berkuatkuasa kebelakangan
sedangkan ini di larang oleh Perkara 7 Perlembagaan Persekutuan.
Justeru itu Encik Lambert Rasa-Ratnam berhujjah bahawa jika Mahkamah
ini memutuskan bahawa Tribunal mempunyai bidangkuasa ke atas
perjanjian jualbeli yang dimasuki sebelum 1 Disember 2002, beliau
menggesa Mahkamah menghadkan pemakaian seksyen 16AD hanya kepada
perjanjian yang dimasuki selepas tarikh tersebut.
(11) Di dalam hujjahan balasnya, Peguam Negara bagi pihak responden
merujuk kepada kes Energoprojek (M) Holdings v PP supra, dan
menekankan bahawa Mahkamah perlu melihat kepada tujuan sesuatu
perundangan digubal. Tujuan Parlimen menggubal Akta Pemaju Perumahan
(Kawalan dan Pelesenan) 1966 ialah untuk melindungi pembeli-pembeli
rumah daripada pemaju perumahan. Seksyen 16AD, hujjah Peguam Negara,
tidak boleh ditafsir sebagai mewujudkan suatu kesalahan bagi
kemungkiran perjanjian kerana di bawah seksyen itu yang menjadi
kesalahan adalah ketidakpatuhan kepada award Tribunal. Kedua-dua
perkara itu, mengikut Peguam Negara adalah tidak berhubungkait. Oleh
kerana yang menjadi kesalahan jenayah ialah ketidakpatuhan kepada
award dan award itu hanya diberi selepas 1 Disember 2002. Seksyen
16AD, tegas Peguam Negara, adalah berkuatkuasa secara prospektif dan
oleh demikian tidaklah bercanggah dengan Perkara 7 Perlembagaan
Persekutuan.
(12) Persoalan di hadapan Mahkamah ini ialah sama ada Tribunal
mempunyai bidangkuasa mendengar tuntutan yang timbul daripada
perjanjian jualbeli yang dimasuki sebelum tarikh Akta Pindaan
berkuatkuasa. Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan Mahkamah Rayuan bahawa
bidangkuasa Tribunal adalah sebagaimana diperuntukkan oleh seksyen
16N(2) yang berbunyi:-
“The jurisdiction of the Tribunal shall be limited to a claim that
is based on a cause of action arising from the sale and purchase
agreement entered into between the homebuyer and the licensed
housing developer which is brought by a homebuyer not later than
twelve months from the date of issuance of the certificate of
fitness for occupation for the housing accommodation or the expiry
date of the defects liability period as set out in the sale and
purchase agreement.”
(13) Sehubungan ini, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada sekysen 16N(3) dan
seksyen 16O(1) Akta Pindaan yang masing-masingnya memperuntukkan
bahawa:-
“16N(1)……………………………………………………………..
(2)…………………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………………………
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) no claim shall be affected or
defeated on the ground that no sale and purchase agreement has been
entered into between the homebuyer and the licensed housing
developer at the time when the cause of action accrues if there
exists a previous dealing between the homebuyer and the licensed
housing developer in respect of the acquisition of the housing
accommodation.”
“160(1) Notwithstanding that the amount or value of the
subject-matter claimed or in issue exceeds twenty-five thousand
ringgit, the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine
the claim if the parties have entered into an agreement in writing
that the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the
claim.”
Peruntukan-peruntukan di atas menunjukkan bahawa bidangkuasa
Tribunal ditetapkan secara longgar. Ini pada pendapat Mahkamah,
menunjukkan hasrat Parlimen untuk menyediakan suatu forum yang mudah
bagi pembeli-pembeli rumah membuat tuntutan. Mahkamah ini bersetuju
dengan Mahkamah Rayuan bahawa:-
“It is absurd in our view to say that Parliament proceeded to
legislate for the establishment of the Tribunal well aware that it
would only begin to serve its purpose a few years later since it
would be inconceivable for claims to arise on breaches of sale and
purchase agreements entered into prior to the appointed date.
Meanwhile the claims of homebuyers based on breaches of sale and
purchase agreements entered into prior to the appointed date would
continue to languish under the present set up. Surely that must have
been the very mischief which Parliament intended to address when it
legislated for the establishment of the Tribunal.”
(14) Di dalam kes Chebaro v Chebaro [1986] 2 ALL ER 897 pihak-pihak
telah berkahwin di Beirut, Lebanon dan menetap di United Kingdom.
Mereka kemudian berpisah tetapi masih tinggal di England. Pada 16
April 1985, atas permohonan suami, dikri cerai telah diberikan di
Lebanon. Selepas seksyen 12 “Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act
1984” berkuatkuasa di England pada 16 September 1985, isteri telah
memohon kebenaran untuk suatu perintah untuk relif kewangan. Seksyen
12 Akta itu berbunyi:-
“Where – (a) a marriage has been dissolved or annulled, or the
parties to a marriage have been legally separated, by means of
judicial or other proceedings in an overseas country, and (b) the
divorce, annulment or legal separation is entitled to be recognized
as valid in England and Wales, either party to the marriage may
apply to the court in the manner prescribed by rules of court for an
order for financial relief under this Part of this Act.”
Sheldon J membenarkan permohonan isteri dan di dalam penghakimannya
di m.s. 903 berkata:-
“Apart from his reliance in the present case on the general
proposition that legislation is not to be regarded as having
retrospective operation unless such a construction is unavoidable,
counsel for the husband has pointed to the unfair consequences to
the husband that might follow in such an event; the creation of new
rights and obligations and by the imposition on him of potentially
severe financial liability which did not exist when his marriage was
dissolved. The possibility of such disadvantages, of course, I
accept; indeed, the risk that such consequences will follow forms
the basis of the court’s dislike of retrospective legislation. That
is not to say, however, that such risks are not contemplated or even
intended by Parliament when introducing new legislation.”
Di m.s. 904 YA berkata:-
“In my judgment,……those words, in their ordinary and natural
meaning, apply initially to all cases in which the divorce,
annulment or legal separation has been pronounced in judicial or
other proceedings overseas, whatever the date of such proceedings
and even if it was before 16b September 1985, and accordingly, the
provisions in question are retrospective in their effect.”
(15) Terhadap keputusan YA Hakim itu, suami merayu kepada Mahkamah
Rayuan dan Balcombe L.J di dalam Chebaro v Chebaro 1987 Fam 127
berkata di m.s. 131:-
“…in my judgment the meaning of the words used is plain and
unequivocal. The use of the past tense – “Where….. a marriage has
been dissolved” - in contradistinction to the present tense in the
following paragraph – and………the divorce….. is entitled to be
recognized” – makes it clear that the section is intended to apply
to a decree of divorce, whenever pronounced and whether before or
after 16 September 1985…..Further support for this construction is
afforded by the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of section
15(1) of the Act of 1984. These lay down the jurisdictional
requirements which have to be satisfied for the court to entertain
an application for financial relief under Part III. They are if:
“(a) either of the parties to the marriage was domiciled in England
and Wales …. on the date on which the divorce, annulment or legal
separation obtained in overseas country took effect in that country;
or (b) either of the parties was habitually resident in England and
Wales throughout the period of one year ending with the date….on
which the divorce, annulment or legal separation obtained in the
overseas country took effect in that country;….”
This is language which it is hard to reconcile with a construction
that limits the operation of section 12 only to those overseas
divorces granted after the date when Part III came into force.”
Neill L.J. pula berkata di ms. 134:-
“In my judgment the intention of the legislature can be determined
with sufficient certainty by looking at the words of section 12(1)
of the Act of 1984 by themselves. It is plain from the concluding
words of the subsection that a person can apply to the court for
financial relief if the conditions set out in paragraphs (a) and (b)
are satisfied. It is also to be observed that this right can be
exercised by either party to the marriage.”
(16) Jelas daripada ungkapan-ungkapan penghakiman di atas, Mahkamah
itu mengambil pendekatan bahawa mengikut maksud dan kesan biasa
seksyen 12 itu, soal sama ada sesuatu perkahwinan itu dibubarkan
sebelum atau selepas seksyen itu berkuatkuasa tidak penting. Apa
yang penting ialah syarat-syarat yang dinyatakan di dalam seksyen
itu dipenuhi.
(17) Prinsip yang sama juga dipakai di dalam kes Hager v Osborne
[1992] Fam 94. Di dalam kes itu, pemohon telah pada 5 Julai 1990
memohon, di bawah seksyen 11B “Guardianship of Minors Act 1971” yang
berkuatkuasa pada 1 April 1989, peruntukan kewangan bagi anaknya
yang dilahirkan pada 23 December 1983. Responden menafikan dirinya
ayah kepada anak itu dan memohon membatalkan tuntutan pemohon atas
alasan, antara lainnya, bahawa seksyen 11B itu tidak berkuatkuasa
kebelakangan. Seksyen 11B itu berbunyi:-
“The court may, on the application of either parent of a child, make
– (a) in the case of proceedings in the High Court or a county
court, one or more of the orders mentioned in subsection (2) of this
section;…..(2) The orders referred to in subsection (1) of this
section are – (a) an order requiring one parent to make to the other
parent for the benefit of the child, or to the child, such
periodical payments, and for such term as may be specified in the
order;….(c) an order requiring one parent to pay to the other parent
for the benefit of the child, or to the child, such lump sum as may
be so specified; (d) an order requiring either parent to transfer to
the other parent for the benefit of the child, or to the child such
property as may be so specified, being property to which the
first-mentioned parent is entitled, either in possession or
reversion; (e) an order requiring that a settlement of such a
property as may be so specified, being property to which either
parent is so entitled, be made to the satisfaction of the court for
the benefit of the child.’”
(18) Merujuk kepada penghujjahan peguam responden YA Hakim berkata
di m.s 99:-
“Mr. Turner….submits, and there is attraction to this submission,
that by section 2 of the Affiliation Proceedings Act 1957, three
years having elapsed since the child’s birth without the respondent
having paid money for the child’s maintenance, the respondent had
acquired the right pursuant to section 2 of the Affiliation
Proceedings Act 1957 not to be sued for maintenance thereafter, and
accordingly, that accrued right should not be taken away from him
retrospectively.”
Seksyen 2 “Affiliation Proceedings Act 1957” memperuntukkan masa
bagi membuat aduan mengenai “paternity” seperti berikut:-
“(a) at any time within three years from the child’s birth, or, (b)
at any subsequent time, upon proof that the man alleged to be the
father of the child has within the three years next after the birth
paid money for its maintenance…”
Berhubung peruntukan ini YA Hakim berkata:-
“It is common ground that the respondent made no such payment for
the boy’s maintenance, and consequently the mother would not have
been entitled to seek an order for such maintenance after 23
December 1986. That date passed without any further proceedings
being launched and the respondent was thus entitled to feel that he
was no longer at risk of being required to maintain his child.”
YA Hakim bagaimanapun menolak permohonan responden untuk membatalkan
tindakan pemohon dengan menyatakan demikian di m.s. 101:-
“In my judgment, the natural and ordinary meaning of section 11B of
the Act 1971, taken in isolation and taken in the context of the
other provisions I have referred to, leads inevitably to the
conclusion that no rule or presumption against retrospectivity
operates so as to prevent the claim being made on the facts such as
those before me.”
(19) Demikian juga dengan rayuan di hadapan Mahkamah ini.
Berasaskan ungkapan-ungkapan penghakiman di atas, Mahkamah ini
bersetuju dengan Mahkamah Rayuan bahawa mengikut seksyen 16N(2),
asalkan tuntutan di hadapan Tribunal itu melibatkan perjanjian
jualbeli di antara pembeli rumah dan pemaju perumahan berlesen dan
tuntutan dibuat dalam masa tidak melebihi 12 bulan daripada tarikh
pengeluaran sijil penghunian atau tarikh luput tempoh liabiliti
kecacatan seperti dinyatakan di dalam perjanjian jualbeli, maka
Tribunal mempunyai bidangkuasa untuk mendengar tuntutan tersebut
tanpa mengira tarikh perjanjian. Tafsiran ini, pada pendapat
Mahkamah ini, diperkuatkan oleh seksyen 16N(3) yang memperuntukkan
bahawa sesuatu tuntutan tidak akan dijejaskan atau digagalkan atas
alasan tiada perjanjian jualbeli wujud di antara pembeli rumah dan
pemaju perumahan berlesen pada masa kausa tindakan akru jika
terdapat suatu urusan terdahulu antara pihak-pihak itu mengenai
pemerolehan penghunian rumah. Justeru pada pendapat Mahkamah ini,
tarikh perjanjian bukanlah perkara yang material bagi membolehkan
Tribunal mendengar tuntutan pembeli rumah itu.
(20) Dari suatu sudut yang lain, wajar diingat bahawa Akta Pindaan
memperuntukkan perubahan forum daripada Mahkamah kepada Tribunal.
Ketara ini adalah perkara berkaitan prosedur dan bukannya substantif.
Oleh yang demikian ianya adalah berkuatkuasa kebelakangan. Prinsip
ini telah ditegaskan di dalam kes-kes Ramzan Darzi and Others v. Mst
Azizi and Others (1976) CLJ 897 dan New India Insurance Co. Ltd v.
Shanti Misra AIR 1976 SC 237. Di dalam kes Ramzan Darzi, Jaswant
Singh C.J. di dalam penghakiman majoriti berkata di m.s. 898 dan
899:-
“The point that therefore remains for consideration is whether the
choice of forum relates to the realm of procedure or not. That the
choice of forum is a matter of procedure and is not a matter of
substantive right and in most cases a new Act would have a
retrospective effect so far as the choice of forum is concerned
appears to be well settled. Reference in this connection may be made
to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Hazari Tewari v. Mt.
Maktula, AIR 1932 All 30, where Sulaiman, Ag. C. J. while
interpreting the new Tenancy Act which conferred jurisdiction on the
revenue court and barred the jurisdiction of the civil court in the
matter of a suit in respect of which adequate relief could be
obtained by way of a revenue suit observed as follows:-
“The choice of forum is a matter of procedure and not a substantive
right, and in most cases a new Act would have a retrospective effect
so far as the choice of forum is concerned.”
To the same effect is a decision of the Madras High Court in V. C.
K. Bus Service v. H. B. Sethna, AIR 1965 Mad 149 where it was held
as follows:-
“No litigant has or can have, vested right in a particular forum. He
cannot say as a matter of right that his suit or application should
be tried by this or that forum which existed on the date his cause
of action arose. Forum belongs to the realm of procedure and does
not constitute substantive right of a party or a litigant. It should
also be borne in mind that cause of action is not to be confused
with a forum, and a cause of action, whatever vested rights it may
carry with it, does not include a right to insist upon a particular
court or Tribunal or Judge or any other. It follows, therefore, that
any statutory law which changes a forum, may not raise a question of
retrospective operation, unless, of course in exceptional cases, it
is inseparably intertwined with vested rights.”
Di dalam kes New India Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Shanti Misra, supra,
Untwalia J menyatakan demikian di m.s. 240:-
“On the plain language of Sections 110A and 110F there should be no
difficulty in taking the view that the change in law was merely a
change of forum i.e. a change of adjectival or procedural law and
not of substantive law. It is a well-established proposition that
such a change of law operates retrospectively and the person has to
go to the new forum even if his cause of action or right of action
accrued prior to the change of forum. He will have a vested right of
action but not a vested right of forum. If by express words the new
forum is made available only to causes of action arising after the
creation of the forum, then the retrospective operation of the law
is taken away. Otherwise the general rule is to make it
retrospective. The expressions “arising out of an accident”
occurring in sub-section (1) and “over the area in which the
accident occurred”, mentioned in sub-s.(2) clearly show that the
change of forum was meant to be operative retrospectively
irrespective of the fact as to when the accident occurred.’’
(21) Hujjahan pihak perayu bahawa hak-hak substantifnya adalah
terjejas dan Perkara 7 (1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dicabuli adalah
pada pendapat Mahkamah ini tidak berasas. Perkara 7 berbunyi:-
“No person shall be punished for an act or omission which was not
punishable by law when it was done or made, and no person shall
suffer greater punishment for an offence than was prescribed by law
at the time it was committed.”
Seksyen 16AD pula memperuntukkan seperti berikut:-
(1) Any person who fails to comply with an award made by the
Tribunal within the period specified therein commits an offence and
shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding five thousand
ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to
both.
(2) In the case of a continuing offence, the offender shall, in
addition to the penalties under subsection (1), be liable to a fine
not exceeding one thousand ringgit for each day or part of a day
during which the offence continues after conviction.”
(22) Mahkamah ini bersetuju bahawa seksyen 16AD memperuntukkan
liabiliti baru ke atas pemaju dan pembeli rumah jika mereka gagal
mematuhi award Tribunal. Tetapi liabiliti ini adalah berkuatkuasa
secara prospektif. Justeru itu seksyen itu tidak melanggar Perkara 7
Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Walaubagaimana pun, kemungkiran perjanjian
bukanlah suatu kesalahan jenayah di bawah seksyen itu. Yang menjadi
kesalahan jenayah ialah ketidakpatuhan kepada award Tribunal dan
ianya tidak dalam apa-apa keadaan pun boleh berkuatkuasa
kebelakangan kerana Tribunal hanya dapat memberi award selepas 1
Disember 2002. Pada pendapat Mahkamah ini seksyen 16AD adalah tidak
relevan kepada bidangkuasa Tribunal.
(23) Kami dengan itu telah sebulat suara memutuskan bahawa Tribunal
mempunyai bidangkuasa untuk mendengar tuntutan yang timbul daripada
perjanjian yang dimasuki sebelum 1 Disember 2002 dan seksyen 16AD
adalah juga terpakai kepada perjanjian yang dimasuki sebelum tarikh
tersebut. Justeru itu rayuan perayu telah ditolak.
t.t.
Bertarikh: 6 September 2004 (TAN SRI DATO’ SRI AHMAD FAIRUZ
BIN DATO’ SHEIKH ABDUL HALIM)
KETUA HAKIM NEGARA
Tarikh Bicara : 14 Jun 2004
Tarikh keputusan : 14 Jun 2004
Peguam-Peguam
Lambert Rasa Ratnam bersama-sama … bagi pihak perayu
Sia Yeow
Tan Sri Abd. Gani Patail bersama-sama … bagi pihak responden
Dato’ Azahar Mohamed
Umi Kalsom Abd. Majid
Mastura Ayob
Norina Bahadon |