BEAUFORD BARU SDN BHD V. GOPALA KRISHNAN V K GOPALAN
HIGH COURT [MELAKA]
LOW HOP BING, J
GUAMAN SIBIL NO. 11-19-20O2 & GUAMAN SIBIL NO. 11-6-2002
12 OCTOBER 2005
DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI MELAKA
DALAM NEGERI MELAKA, MALAYSIA
GUAMAN SIBIL NO. 11-19-20O2 & GUAMAN SIBIL NO. 11-6-2002
ANTARA
BEAUFORD BARU SDN BHD - PERAYU/DEFENDAN
DAN
GOPALA KRISHNAN A/L V.K GOPALAN - RESPONDEN/PLAINTIF
[ NO. 2 ] JUDGMENT
I. APPEALS
The appellant/ defendant ("the defendant") has lodged two appeals
against the decision of the learned magistrate who had:-
1. on 20 September 2000 given judgment with costs in favour of the
respondent ("the plaintiff") with damages to be assessed; and
2. on 18 January 2002 dismissed with costs the defendant's application
to set aside the damages of RM 15,000 assessed against the defendant.
As these two appeals are heard together and relate to the same subject
matter in which the issues are intertwined, I shall refer to them as one
single appeal only.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The defendant is a licensed housing developer for the project known as
Taman Pantai Mas. The plaintiff had on 27 March 1990 entered into a sale
and purchase agreement ("SPA") for the purchase of a corner lot, Lot 260
in the approved layout plan, for the type of houses known as "Pulau Undan"
in the project.
For brevity and convenience, a reference hereinafter to a clause and a
schedule is a reference to the clause in and the schedule to the SPA.
The First Schedule contains the approved layout plan for intermediate
lots on which were to be erected houses without any side porch, while the
house erected for the corner lot is with a side porch.
The Second Schedule contains the authorised building plan for the house
with a side porch for Lot 260 being a corner lot.
The catalogue for the intermediate lots and corner lots stated the
prices "from RM94,888" with an area of 22ft by 70ft i.e. 1540 sq ft.
In the SPA, the purchase price for Lot 260 was stated as RM119,905 with
an area of 212 sq metres, for which a refund of RM 13.50 per sq ft would
be made by the defendant to the plaintiff in the event of a shortfall in
land area.
The house constructed on Lot 260 was without a side porch and the land
area was short of 132 sq ft.
The plaintiff has, vide a notice, demanded a sum of RM 15,000 from the
defendant for not constructing the side porch, and a sum of RM 1,782 (RM
13.50 X 132 sq ft) being the refund for the shortfall in land area.
The defendant made a payment of RM2,500 allegedly as full and final
settlement which the plaintiff has allegedly accepted.
However, the plaintiff has subsequently commenced an action in the
magistrate's court for RM 15,000 for Lot 260 i.e. the corner lot which was
constructed without a side porch.
III. SIDE PORCH
It was submitted by learned counsel Miss Fatima Tahir Ali for the
defendant that:-
1. in the First Schedule, the approved layout plan has set out the
construction of the house as being without a side porch and that the
authorised building plan in the Second Schedule was a standard plan which
the plaintiff has never challenged and should be taken as the truth, as in
Wong Swee Chin v. Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 MLJ 212, at 213 FC; and
2. the plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden of proving the
defendant's breach of the agreement in order to obtain judgment, on the
basis of Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Perwaja Steel Sdn Bhd [1995] 4 MLJ 673 at
676 para 1 HC; and Selvaduray v Chinniah [1939] MLJ 253 CA.
Miss Anis Hasliza bt Ajis, plaintiffs learned counsel, contended that
there was a breach of the SPA by the defendant as the side porch has not
been constructed according to the SPA made under Reg. 11(1) Schedule G to
the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 ("1989
Regulations") to protect the interest of the purchasers and that the
schedules to the SPA form part of the SPA, relying on Kang Yoon Mook
Xavier v Insun Development Sdn Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ 91 HC.
On my part, it is appropriate to restate the principles governing the
interpretation of the SPA which is part of the housing legislation, being
a statutory form of contract contained in Schedule G i.e. SPA for land and
building under the 1989 Regulations made under s. 24 of the Housing
Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 as amended.
In Tan Tian Seng & Anor v Grobina Resorts Sdn Bhd (No. 2) [2005] 7 CLJ
70 at pp 77 & 78, I have the occasion to state that:-
1. The housing legislation is principally aimed at protecting the
interest of purchasers : see Malaysian Law on Housing Developers, 2nd edn
by Salleh Buang, 2002 pp. 7 and 8 : S.E.A. Housing Corporation Sdn. Bhd.
v. Lee Poh Choo [1982] CLJ 355; [1982] CLJ (Rep) 305 per Suffian LP (as he
then was); and Khau Daw You v. Kin Nam Realty Development Sdn. Bhd. [1983]
1 MLJ 335 at 341 per VC George J (later JCA).
2. Statutes must be read as a whole (see:-
Kesultanan Pahang v. Sathask Realty Sdn Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 559);
3. There are circumstances where the nature and purpose of a particular
legislation must be considered when construing its various provisions so
as not to defeat the intention of Parliament (see : Akberdin Hj Abdul
Kader & Anor v. Majlis Peguam Malaysia [2O02] 4 CLJ 689; S.E.A. Housing
Corporation Sdn. Bhd. v. Lee Poh Choo [1982] CLJ 355; [1982] CLJ (Rep)
3O5); and
4. The 1996 Act as amended is a piece of social legislation and hence
its provisions should be given liberal and purposive interpretation i.e.
to promote the general legislative purpose underlying the provisions. (See
Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah v. Westcourt Corporation Sdn Bhd & Other
Appeals [2004] 2 CLJ 617 CA, the judgment of Richard Malanjum JCA (now FCJ)
and s. 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967).
In Westcourt Corporation Sdn Bhd Iwn. Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah
[20O4] 4 CLJ 2O3, the Federal Court through the judgment of Ahmad Fairuz
CJ Malaysia, in affirming the above decision of the Court of Appeal, had
indirectly approved the Court of Appeal's enunciation of the above
principles governing the interpretation of housing legislation.
Further, cl 27 where relevant expressly states as follows:-
"The First, Second schedules hereto shall form part of the agreement
and shall be read, taken and construed as an essential part of this
agreement."
A true construction of the First Schedule leads me to the conclusion
that the approved layout plan was for an intermediate house without a side
porch, while the house for the corner Lot 260 is with a side porch. This
must be read together with the Second Schedule thereto which expressly
provides for the house on Lot 260 to have a side porch.
The plaintiff's case is further fortified by the express terms of the
first part of cl 12 which merits reproduction as follows:-
"12. The said Building shall be constructed in a good and workmanlike
manner in accordance with the plans approved by the Appropriate Authority
as in the Second Schedule."
In the circumstances, I am of the view that there are sufficient
express provisions viz cl 12, the First and the Second Schedules which
when read conjunctively reflect the intention of the parties thereto i.e.
the sale and purchase of a house with a side porch for Lot 260. (See also
Kang Yoon Mook Xavier, supra, at pp. 99C-G per Abdul Malik Ishak J).
There can be no doubt that the plaintiff has discharged the burden of
proof cast on him under s. 101 of the Evidence Act 1950 which was
considered and applied by me in Tenaga Nasional Bhd, supra.
That being the case, the Federal Court judgment delivered by Raja Azlan
Shah CJ(M) (now HRH Sultan of Perak) in Wong Swee Chin, supra, and the
judgment of Terrell Ag CJ in Selvaduray, supra, in the Court of Appeal,
can be of no assistance to the defendant.
I therefore hold that the house which the plaintiff has purchased from
the defendant consists of a side porch as an essential part of the SPA and
the absence of the side porch is clear evidence of a breach of the SPA by
the defendant.
IV. DAMAGES OF RM 15.OO0
Without prejudice to the earlier submission, it was argued for the
defendant that:-
1. the plaintiff is not entitled to the sum of RM 15,000 by way of
liquidated damages as it was not contained in the SPA, referring to
Mohamed Said v. Haji Omar [1966] 1 MLJ 5O;
2. the court below had no power to grant the said sum by way of general
damages which had not been pleaded. Support was sought in Anjalai Animal &
Anor v. Abdul Kareem [1969] 1 MLJ 22 FC; Salih bin Mohamed v. Loh Kim Foon
[1982] 2 MLJ 292; The Chartered Bank v. Yong Chan [1974] 1 MLJ 157 FC; and
3. at most the plaintiff was entitled to damages under s. 74 of the
Contracts Act 1950.
1. The stand taken for the plaintiff is premised on the difference in
the price of the houses for the intermediate lot and the corner lot with
additional land, and also on the basis of cl 12.
In my judgment, there can be no dispute that parties are bound by their
pleadings and the trial court must decide on issues raised in the
pleadings. This is trite law : see e.g. Anjalai Ammal, supra; Salih bin
Mohamed, supra; and The Chartered Bank, supra.
Upon a proper perusal of the statement of claim and the defence in the
appeal record, it is abundantly clear to me the SPA and the breach thereof
by the defendant had been specifically pleaded by the plaintiff. That
being the case, the clauses in the SPA would form the foundation for the
assessment of damages.
In this regard, it is pertinent to refer to the second part of cl 12
which, where relevant, reads as follows:-
"12. No changes thereto or deviation therefrom shall be made without
the consent in writing of the Purchaser The Purchaser shall not be liable
for the cost of such changes or deviations and in the event that the
changes or deviations involve the omissions of works originally agreed to
be carried out by the Vendor, the Purchaser shall be entitled to a
corresponding reduction in the purchase price herein or to damages in
respect thereof."
As the defendant (vendor) has failed to construct the house in
accordance with the plan approved by the appropriate authority as
expressly stated in the first part of cl 12, as well as the First and
Second Schedules, the plaintiff is entitled to a corresponding reduction
in the purchase price or to damages pursuant to cl 12 thereof.
The sum of Ml5,000 has been arrived at as follows:-
Lot 260 (Corner Lot) Intermediate Lot
Area of land 212 sq m
Built-up area 143 sq m 143 sq m
of house
Area of extra 212-143
Land for corner = 69 sq m
lot = 742 sq ft
Cost of extra 742 x RM 13.50
land = RM10,017.00
Purchase price RM119,905 RM94,888
Corresponding RM119,905 - (94,888 + 10,017)
reduction = RM 15,000
in the purchase
price
In the circumstances, I am unable to see any error in the calculation
of the sum pursuant to cl 12.
V. PAYMENT OF RM2,50O
The third and final issue raised for the defendant was that the
plaintiff is now estopped from claiming the sum of RM 15,000 as damages
after having allegedly accepted RM2,500 as full and final settlement
inclusive of the side porch, adding that the claim for RM 15,000 has never
been pleaded. Support was sought in Mohamad Safuan bin Wasidin & Anor v
Mohd Ridhuan bin Ahmad (an infant) [1994] 2 MLJ 187.
The plaintiffs response is that the sum of RM2,500 was for "shortage of
land area" as stated in the plaintiff's two letters of demand and receipt
and so it was not for full and final settlement.
In the earlier part of my judgment, I have comprehensively considered
the pleading point and so would not risk any repetition here.
Next, the subject matter for which the plaintiff has received the sum
of RM2,500 is to be ascertained by reference to the parties' contemporary
documents viz defendant's letter exhibit D9 p. 80 and plaintiffs receipt
at p.81 respectively of the appeal record which stated that the payment
was for "shortage of land area" i.e. shortfall in land area.
However, it must be stated that the plaintiffs claim for the shortfall
in land area was in the sum of RM 1,782 and not RM2,500, which means that
there is an excess of RM718. There must be no unfair enrichment in favour
of the plaintiff in so far as this excess is concerned. Hence, in equity,
the plaintiff must account for it by way of restitution, either as money
had and received, or as money paid by mistake under s. 73 of the Contracts
Act 1950 which where relevant reads as follows:-
"73. A person to whom money has been paid by mistake must repay or
return it." (see e.g. Seek v Wong & Lee [1940] MLJ Rep 146 per Terrell Ag
CJ. High Court of Singapore)
In the circumstances, the excess of RM718 must be off-set against the
plaintiffs claim for RM 15,000 in relation to the side porch.
VI. CONCLUSION
On the foregoing grounds, I allow this appeal in part so that the sum
of RM718 is to be deducted from the judgment sum of RM 15,000, in which
case judgment is therefore given in favour of the plaintiff in the sum of
RM 14,282 only with interest at 8% per annum from the date of judgment in
the magistrate's court i.e. 20 September 2000 to the date of realisation
and costs in the court below. For this appeal, I make an order of fixed
costs of RM2,500 in favour of the plaintiff.
( DATUK WIRA LOW HOP BING ) - Judge High Court Malaya, Melaka
12th October 2005
SOLICITOR:-
Miss Fatima Tahir Ali for the defendant, Advocates & Solicitors, No.
85A, Jalan Melaka Raya 24 Taman Melaka Raya 1 75000 Melaka.
Miss Anis Hasliza bt Ajis learned counsel for the plaintiff Advocates &
Solicitors, Messrs J. Azmi & Associates, 232, Taman Melaka Raya 1, 75000
Melaka.
REFERENCE:-
Wong Swee Chin v. Public Prosecutor [1981] MLJ 212, at 213
Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Perwaja Steel Sdn Bhd [1995] 4 MLJ 673
Selvaduray v Chinniah [1939] MLJ 253
Kang Yoon Mook Xavier v Insun Development Sdn Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ 91
Tan Tian Seng & Anor v Grobina Resorts Sdn Bhd (No. 2) [2005] 7 CLJ 70
S.E.A. Housing Corporation Sdn. Bhd. v. Lee Poh Choo [1982] CLJ 355;
[1982] CLJ (Rep) 3O5
Khau Daw You v. Kin Nam Realty Development Sdn. Bhd. [1983] 1 MLJ 335
Kesultanan Pahang v. Sathask Realty Sdn Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 559
Akberdin Hj Abdul Kader & Anor v. Majlis Peguam Malaysia [2OO2] 4 CLJ
689
S.E.A. Housing Corporation Sdn. Bhd. v. Lee Poh Choo [1982] CLJ 355;
[1982] CLJ (Rep) 305
Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah v. Westcourt Corporation Sdn Bhd &
Other Appeals [2004] 2 CLJ 617
Westcourt Corporation Sdn Bhd Iwn. Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah
[2004] 4 CLJ 2O3
Seck v Wong & Lee [1940] MLJ Rep 146 Mohamed Said v. Haji Omar [1996] 1
MLJ 50
Anjalai Animal & Anor. v. Abdul Kareem [1969] 1 MLJ 22
Salih bin Mohamed v. Loh Kim Foon [1982] 2 MLJ 292
The Chartered Bank v. Yong Chan [1974] 1 MLJ 157
Mohamad Safuan bin Wasidin & Anor v Mohd Ridhuan bin Ahmad (an infant)
[1994] 2 MLJ 187
Malaysian Law on Housing Developers, 2nd edn by Salleh Buang, 2002 pp.
7 and 8
s. 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 s. 73 of the Contracts
Act 1950